Economics Brown Bag: Sulagna Dasgupta

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Date(s) - 11/08/2021
12:00 pm - 1:00 pm

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Ph.D. students in the Department of Economics hold a weekly Brown Bag series on Mondays from noon to 1 p.m. on Zoom. These events provide an opportunity for a student to present and workshop a research paper or idea with peers and faculty. For more information, please contact Bhavya Sinha.

Monday, November 8 | 12-1 p.m.

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Sulagna Dasgupta, University of Chicago

“Persuasion with Hard and Soft Information”


A privately informed sender with state-independent preferences communicates with an uninformed receiver about a two-dimensional state. The sender can verifiably disclose the state’s first dimension with some probability, and can communicate about both dimensions via cheap talk. When the two dimensions are positively dependent, unravelling occurs – ie. the sender fully reveals evidence whenever he has it – if and only if the sender has evidence with probability one. Whenever the game features multiple equilibria, varying across equilibria, I show that equilibria that feature more disclosure are worse for the sender, with the disclosure minimizing equilibrium being sender-best. Comparative statics results indicate a substitution effect between communication via cheap talk and disclosure. I fully characterize the sender-optimal equilibrium for a few applications, and provide an extension to multiple unverifiable dimensions and non-monotonic sender utility under certain equilibrium selection rules.

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